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TE CMSIS OF POVERTY _AW AND
THE DE MiANDS OF BENEVOLENCE
PAUL 1R. TREMBLAY
I
INTRODUCTION
Today's Symposium confronts a "crisis" in the legal profession.
That crisis concerns rationing legal services for the poor. What this
means, we can assume, is that in the late 1990s the methods for
providing legal services to our poorest citizens' are dysfunctional,
leading to palpable tragedies which warrant our most urgent atten-
tion. Indeed, these tragedies are readily apparent; citizens with le-
gitimate legal claims, whether for housing, income, education,
health care, or safety, are unable to pursue them because of an un-
fair and inadequate distribution of legal assistance.2
Even the most cynical of us will recognize, though, that this
state of affairs is not new to the 1990s. The shortage of available
Clinical Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. This essay represents a
revision of remarks presented at the 1997 Symposium hosted by the Annual Sunvy
of American Law at New York University School of Law on October 31, 1997, enti-
tled "Crisis in the Legal Profession: Rationing Legal Services for the Poor." I thank
the student organizers of this conference and Professor Paula Galowitz for their
kind invitation to me to participate in this event. I also thank Amy DeLisa for
valuable research assistance.
1. I use the term "citizen" here as a more apt term than "dient" and vithout
any intended implication that only persons who are United States citizens are the
subject of the present crisis and resulting tragedies. See Peter Margulies, The Mother
With PoorJudgment and Other Tales of the Unexpected" A Civic Republican Wiew of Differ-
ence and Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. U. L REv. 695, 695 n.1 (1994) (defending
the use of the term " 'citizens seeking legal services'---dtizens for short" as a prefer-
able alternative to the more submissive-sounding term 'clients").
2. All available data, of which there is a great deal, indicate that a large pro-
portion of poor citizens with legal needs cannot obtain meaningful legal represen-
tation. See, eg., Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Seruies for the Poor, 83 GEo.
L.J. 1529, 1536 (1995) (noting the chronic shortage of legal services for the poor,
both historically and at present); Tigran IV. Eldred & Thomas Schoenherr, The
Lawyer's Duty of Public Servie More Than Charity?, 96 W. VA. L REv. 367, 372-73
(1993-94). Eldred and Schoenherr cite a survey by the American Bar Association
indicating that only 20% of the legal needs of the poor are being addressed. Prior
studies have consistently shown the same scarcity of representation for persons
who cannot afford to pay. See CHARLEs WotFRAIA, MoDmv L~E %AL ETmcs § 16.7.3,
at 938 (1986) (reporting studies which demonstrate a lack of available legal serv-
ices for the poor in the mid-1980s).
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legal services has been endemic for as far back as anyone can re-
call.3 What is it, then, that attracts our attention now to consider
the present state of affairs as "critical"? Perhaps such a relative or
comparative assessment is unnecessary-the fact that a tragedy is
persistent does not mean that it cannot also be a critical one. But it
seems that a comparative assessment is indeed at work here, and
that there are many within the relevant comer of our profession
who believe that the present times do represent a distinct emer-
gency, significantly different from those emergencies of the past.
This crisis is not the result of the fact that legal services must be
"rationed;" legal services for the poor will always be rationed, re-
gardless of the funding scheme adopted.4 The new crisis, it seems,
reflects the predicament created by the current Congress, with its
imposition of fiscal and operational restrictions.5
Money has always been a problem for legal services providers,
of course. Even in the greenest of the salad days, for instance, fed-
eral funding for legal services through the Legal Services Corpora-
tion ("LSC") was targeted to provide two full-time lawyers for every
ten thousand poor people.6 That target was never reached, but
even if it were, one lawyer would have been grossly inadequate to
meet the needs of five thousand people. What is additionally worri-
some today is the source of the limited, and now increasingly re-
stricted, federal funds. A more and more conservative Congress has
3. It is not difficult to find similar complaints in the 1970s and 1980s. See, e.g.,
Mauro Cappaletti & James Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes and Variations, 24
STAN. L. REV. 347, 379 (1972) (characterizing state and federal funding for the
poor in the early 1970s as "trivial"); Roger C. Cramton, Crisis in Legal Services for the
Poor, 26 VIu. L. REV. 521 (1981) (reporting President Reagan's threats to abolish
the Legal Services Corporation); WOLFRAM, supra note 2, at 938.
4. I have argued that the elasticity of the demand for lawyer assistance by poor
citizens makes rationing a fact of life for poverty law practices. The interesting
questions surround how the rationing takes place. See Paul R. Tremblay, Toward A
Communiy-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1101 (1990).
5. Others see the current "crisis" as a reflection of the confusion and emascu-
lation of modern poverty law practice. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients,
Disabling Lawyers, 43 HAsMINGs L.J. 769, 775 (1992); Matthew Diller, Poverty Lawyer-
ingin the Golden Age, 93 MIcH. L. REV. 1401, 1424 (1995); Feldman, supra note 2, at
1530; David R. Esquivel, Note, The Identity Crisis in Public Interest Law, 46 DuKE L.J.
327, 327 (1996).
6. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 241 (1988). Luban notes that at
that time the national average was one lawyer for every 470 people. See id. Com-
pare this with Foreword: Pennsylvania Legal Services at Risk, 68 TEmP. L. Rw. 541, 552
n.62 (1995), a more recent commentary which describes the ratio in 1994 as one
lawyer for every 305 United States citizens.
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slashed LSC budgets7 and saddled its programs with elaborate re-
strictions and reporting requirements intended to prevent those
programs from advocating effectively on behalf of their clients.8 In
the early 1980s, legal services lawyers confronted an unfriendly
President but a somewhat accommodating Congress. That
anguished time was nevertheless survivable, for even the most mali-
cious President has a limited capacity to shut down a congressio-
nally approved program, just as his control over the ultimate
budget is similarly limited.
The mid-to-late 1990s have introduced a reversed political ar-
rangement which is far more threatening to federally funded legal
services work. The combination of a mildly supportive President
and an openly hostile congressional leadership leaves LSC ex-
tremely vulnerable, for even an intensely sympathetic President
cannot single-handedly augment a budget or pass legislation. This,
then, is the "crisis" that we face today, and in these terms it is one
that is different from-and arguably more threatening than-the
usual crises that advocates for the downtrodden are accustomed to
enduring.
7. See, e.g., David Barringer, DownsizedJustie, A.B.A.J., July 1996, at 60. The
LSG budget grew until the Reagan presidency, at which point the budget was
slashed and people who did not approve of ISG were appointed as directors. After
these initial cuts, one research group noted that 61 programs funded by LSC lost
30% of their staff attorneys and several Legal Services offices had to dose dom.
See Eldred & Schoenherr, supra note 2, at 370-71 (reporting that in the 1996
budget, Congress cut Legal Services funding by one-third, reducing the budget
from $400 million to $278 million); see also LeAN, supra note 6, at 241-42; Bar-
ringer, supra, at 61.
8. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996
("OCRAA'), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). Disallowed activites in-
clude: "participation in redistricting matters, lobbying, class actions, representa-
tion of illegal aliens, abortion-related litigation, litigation on behalf of prisoners,
and eviction proceedings of individuals charged with selling drugs." Benjamin L
Liebman, Recent Legislation-Congress Imposes New Restridions on Use ofFunds by Legal
Senfices Corporation, 110 HARv. L REv. 1346, 1347 n.8 (1997). Congress also barred
legal services lawyers from pursuing constitutional challenges to welfare la.s, see
OCRAA § 504(a) (16); imposed substantial record-keeping and time-keeping re-
quirements, see OCRAA § 504(a)(8)-(10); and forbade legal services offices from
claiming, collecting, or accepting attorneys fees, see OCRAA § 504(a) (13).
For further discussion of recent congressional restrictions, see Barringer,
supra note 7, at 60; John G. Taylor, House Wants Legal-Aid Funding to Continue Near
Current Levels, SAcRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 26, 1997, at AS. For a review of the tradi-
tional congressional restriction against lobbying by poverty la%-yers, see Paula
Galowitz, Restrictions on Lobbying by Legal Services Attorneys: Redefining Ptofessional
Norms and Obligations, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 39 (1994).
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What I wish to do in these remarks is to consider, in the wake
of this new crisis, some ideas about lawyering for poor people and
to revisit some familiar questions about the appropriate role for
lawyers in the lives of the poor. There are four areas I wish to ex-
plore. I first examine the crisis mentality, in order to ask whether
the present state of affairs is really so bad after all. I then argue
that, while there are some prominent views within contemporary
poverty law discourse that might imply the contrary, this crisis is
real, and our fears warranted. I next review some institutional im-
plications of our rejection of the cynics and rebels who would down-
play the crisis. Finally, I touch upon the respective roles of poverty
lawyers and community members in allocating the scarce legal and
advocacy resources.
II
THE MYTH OF A CRISIS?
I can imagine two arguments that might lead one to conclude
that the present fears about the loss of all federal funding of legal
services are overstated. These arguments do not discount the likeli-
hood of the loss of funding, but instead question whether the aboli-
don of LSC would in fact be a terrible event. Let us call these
arguments the Cynic's View and the Rebel's View.
The Cynic makes the following point: legal aid advocates have
lobbied state and federal officials and potential pro bono lawyers
with impressive studies showing that only the tiniest fraction of the
legal needs of the poor is being met. For instance, a 1993 Project
Advisory Group 9 study estimated that $3.6 billion (in 1993 dollars)
would be necessary for LSC to meet the legal needs of poor peo-
ple.10 Funding for 1997 is less than $300 million-less than 8% of
PAG's 1993 target.11 From these statistics, the Cynic carefully rea-
sons that if more than 90% of poor people are already getting by
without a lawyer's help, it would not be a revolutionary change-
9. The Project Advisory Group ("PAG") is an organization dedicated to lobby-
ing in support of, and monitoring the status of, federal and state funding for civil
legal services for the poor. PAG has recently announced that it will cease opera-
tions as a distinct entity and merge with the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association ("NLADA"), a professional association of civil legal services lawyers and
public defender attorneys. See NLADA, NLADA/PAGJoint Committee Report (Septem-
ber 1997) (visited Feb. 7, 1999) <http://www.nlada.org/jointrpt.htm>.
10. See Working Paper by PAG to Advocate for EqualJustice, Equal Justice for
People in Poverty: The Long-Term Goal of Legal Services 13 (1993) (on file with
Annual Survey of Ameyican Law).
11. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, tit. 5, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3059 (1996) (appropriating $283,000,000 to LSC).
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hardly a crisis-to eliminate LSC altogether, thereby leaving ap-
proximately 95% of the poor without legal assistance.' 2 Put an-
other way, the legal needs studies actually imply that it is not
necessary to provide lawyers for this small segment of poor people,
since so many are able to survive without such services. And so, the
argument goes, it would not be so dramatic if the funding was dis-
continued. Because these studies' statistics seem reliable,1 3 the
Cynic does need to be heard.
The Rebel takes another approach, but ends up at a similar
conclusion: that the end of federal funding for legal services for the
poor is no cause for significant worry. She argues that the demise
of LSC would not only be tolerable, but might even be somewhat
advantageous if we take the long view about the plight of disadvan-
taged citizens. Her reasoning derives from the classic "sublimation"
argument, which appears in both historical assessments about the
beginning of federal legal services and in more critical literature
from the 1990s about poverty lawyers.14
The sublimation argument says that the real reason the power
structure has invited and permitted the funding of legal aid is that
law offices in poor communities serve to forestall insurrection.' 5
12. The continued availability of private foundation and state money for legal
services accounts for the Cynic's conclusion that approximately 5% of needy poor
people would still receive some representation after the demise of LSC. &e, e.g.,
Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Betwen the Private and the Soda Motive to
Use the Legal System, 26J. LEcxiL STUD. 575, 612 (1997) (noting "$640 million from
Congress and private donors" for LSC purposes in 1994, when the federal LSC
budget did not exceed $400 million). See also Brief for Petitioners, Phillips v.
Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998) (No. 96-1578), available in 1997
WL 525726 (pointing out that natiomide Interest on Laivyer Trust Accounts
("IOLTA7) programs generate about $100 million per year).
13. But see Deborah L Rhode, The Retoric of Professional Reform, 45 Mare- L
REv. 274 (1986). Professor Rhode, while quite supportive of legal services for the
poor, notes that the definition of a "legal" problem can be very expansive. As a
result "there is considerable fuzziness to the concept" of greater access tojustice as
discussed in the legal needs studies. IM. at 281; see also Ric:HAD ABEL, A !n ,%N
Lmvvs 128 (1989) ("Further analysis reveals that the relationship betiveen con-
sumers and lawyers is more complex" than the legal needs studies imply.).
14. See, &g., Raymond H. Brescia et al., ltos in Charge Anyway? A Proposal for
Community Based Legal Services, 25 FoRDHAm URB. I.J. 831, 831-38 & n.43 (1998);
Feldman, supra note 2, at 1597 n.192 & 1617-18; Kenneth L Penegar, Te Five
Pillars of Professionalism, U. Prrr. L. REv. 307, 325-26 (1988).
15. See Feldman, supra note 2, at 1617-18 ("stress[ing] the 'remissive' role of
law and its lawyer-agents in sublimating conflict and politics") (citing Ptnu Rwsi,
THE TRIUMPH OF THE THErPEuna USES OF FArrH AFrER FREUD 236 (1966)). David
Luban relies on this theme when he argues that the alternative to funding legal
services for the poor is a Lockean "state of war": "If have-nots are excluded from
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Legal aid offers a patina ofjustice, a convenient deception that im-
plies to the power structure that poor people are treated with the
same respect as the rest of the world. 16 If a poor person loses pub-
lic benefits or forfeits her right to stay in her apartment, those ac-
tions should not really be perceived as "unjust" because the
government has established law firms ready and able to protect
those poor people who need it most. This image of free legal serv-
ices diverts creative, rebellious energy away from true social change
and towards incremental, "regnant" change. 17
Without legal services, or at least without the kind of legal serv-
ices that we see now, one might conclude that this rebellious energy
would be directed toward community action, collectivization, and
grass-roots movements-real progress instead of illusory progress. 18
A Rebel would then conclude not only that it is no major tragedy to
discontinue legal services funding, but also that conservative legal
services critics will come to rue the day the system of injustice is
exposed for what it really is. The illusions of due process and fair-
ness and the opportunity to be heard will finally have been
removed.
III
A "CRISIS" IN FACT
A. The Day-to-Day Crisis
I wish to defend the crisis mindset. I mean to try to under-
stand why these two arguments do not persuade me, or (I'd wager)
very many of us. And I shall agree immediately that I have perhaps
set up straw people, but my main purpose is not necessarily to show
access to the legal system, 'the end whereof being to protect and redress the inno-
cent', their alternative is the law of the streets, of resistance that is entirely right-
ful." LUBAN, supra note 6, at 255 (quoting JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT § 20, at 322 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1960)) (citation omitted).
16. Cf Diller, supra note 5, at 1413 (commenting that test case litigation
might be perceived as counterproductive because "small successes won in litigation
may reassure the public that society is responsive to the grievances of poor
people.").
17. See generally GERALD L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION
OF PROGRESSIVE LAw PRAcriCE (1992). L6pez develops his ideas of "rebellious" and
"regnant" lawyering in his famous book on rebellious lawyering.
18. See id. at 28 (arguing that regnant lawyering "helps undermine the very
possibility for re-imagined social arrangements that lies at the heart of any serious
effort to take on the status quo"); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinoinies of
Poverty Law Practice and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 659, 665 (1987-88) (the conventional practices of poverty lawyers "decon-
textualiz[e], atomiz[e], and depoliticiz[e]" their clients' class struggle).
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why these hypothetical arguments are wrong, but to use them to
recognize a deeper truth about the angst of legal services practice.
This deeper truth is about pain. I do not know exactly what
advocates for the poor might accomplish in the long term, but I
know for certain that an effective lawyer can reduce felt pain for
real people.19 Perhaps I should choose a different verb-perhaps I
should be saying that lawyers can defer pain, or postpone pain. But
either way the pain is diminished. Neither of the above arguments
sufficiently acknowledges that realization, nor do many of the argu-
ments, so common in today's literature, about the ineffectiveness of
legal services lawyers.20 I work in a legal aid office, albeit one oper-
ated as a law school clinic. When we win or settle an eviction case,
we keep a family in an apartment, off the streets, or out of a shelter
for a few months, or perhaps even a few years. Their lives, in that
respect, are much less tormented than had I not been there. If we
win SSI benefits, or an unemployment case, or welfare benefits, we
have made a palpable difference in the daily life of that family.
Maybe there are fewer sleepless nights. Maybe there is some real
food on the table. Maybe, with some of the worst financial fears
ameliorated, there will be less worry, and less frustration, and more
kindness among family members, and maybe children will do better
in school, and parents will have more patience ....
Do I claim too much here? Of that I have no doubt. But there
is a real immediacy to alleviating the suffering that comes from a
lack of money, the worry about having to live in a shelter, the fear
of domestic violence, or of losing custody of a daughter, even if
only for a short while. And those who are facing the pain seem to
ask us, the legal aid lawyers, for help in getting this short term
relief 2 1
19. For a defense of conventional, instrumental lawering, see Cathy Lesser
Mansfield, Deconstructing Reconstructive Poverty Law Praaice A Practice-Based Critique
of the Storytelling Aspects of the Theoretics of Practice Afovaernent, 61 BROOL L RE%,. 889
(1995).
20. See, e.g. Feldman, supra note 2. See also L/PEz, supra note 17; Anthony V.
Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law and Practice: L-earning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100
YALE LJ. 2107 (1991); Symposium, The Theoretics of Practice: The Int'gration of Progres-
sive Thought and Action, 43 HAsTIcGs LJ. 717 (1992); Lucie White, Subordination,
Rhetoriial Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on Oe Hearing of Mrs. G., 3B BuFi. L
REN. 1 (1990).
21. See DUller, supra note 5, at 1429 ("Most clients represented by legal services
programs... have a material objective of unusual importance, such as avoiding
eviction or obtaining critically needed subsistence benefits."); see also Mansfield,
supra note 19, at 905.
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Will the benefits I have just described be long-lasting? As the
critics argue, and as I am inclined to agree, probably not. These
clients will soon fall behind in their rent once again. They will still
be unable to live off of their disability or welfare checks. They will
still be desperately poor, and legal services will have done nothing
to change that. Nothing. That is the fly in the ointment, the sober-
ing and perhaps deflating reality.
B. The Cynic's and Rebel's Shortcomings
The Cynic's view, even if accepted, misses the fact that the few
people who get through the door are able to reduce or postpone
their crises because of legal services, and without legal services
would not be able to do so. The reason the Cynic fails so deeply to
resonate with us is that regardless of the numbers that we miss, we
know that we are touching a significant number of people even
with our limited funding. With the triage typical of poverty law
practice, the cases that are handled now-even if they turn out to
be, statistically, a small sample of the country's population in dis-
tress-will tend to represent those who are hurting most deeply.
The Cynic's perspective ignores those folks.
The Rebel's perspective resonates quite a bit more with us, but
suffers from the same serious counterargument created by the spec-
ter of immediate pain. There are important reasons why the Rebel-
lious perspective, even if we agree with it, does not appear all that
frequently in our practices.2 2 The routines and habits of legal serv-
ices lawyers evidence a rejection of the Rebel's View, even though,
when pushed, most would accept its underlying premises.23
One apparent difficulty with the Rebel's view is that in order to
adopt it we have to ignore the pain that exists right in front of us.
We have to say, expressly, that we will not ease that pain, because we
are busy doing other things, more important things, greater things
in the long run.24 The Rebel's view might make a much more sub-
stantial difference, but can we be sure? No-we are not sure, but
22. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 2, at 1536-56 (describing the tendency of
legal aid offices to focus their resources on individual cases rather than on impact
work).
23. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 5, at 1426 (agreeing "with the critics that the
attainment of political strength provides the best, and perhaps the only, prospect
for the lasting and fundamental transformation of poor communities"). See also id.
at 1428 (conceding that, the just-expressed sentiment notwithstanding, litigation is
frequently the most effective instrumental use of lawyer resources).
24. For an example of an office that has made that kind of trade-off in a
thoughtful and community-supported way, see Brian Glick & MatthewJ. Rossman,
Neighborhood Legal Services as House Counsel to Community-Based Efforts to Achieve Eco-
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we are sure that we can postpone or reduce some of the immediate
discomfort. And, in addition to that, if we ask our clients what they
want, if we are responsive to that community, we will hear a lot of
calls for short-term relief.2 The more ambitious relief is much
harder to achieve, and in the meantime there are bills to pay, kids
who need clothes, boyfriends who are threatening, and landlords
who will not provide heat 2 6
IV
THE FELDMAN VIEW
Nobody-well, almost nobody27-will deny that the existing
legal services structure offers credible ameliorative benefits to the
poor people who happen to be fortunate enough to come to the
law office when there are openings for new clients. The two most
nwmicJustice The East Brooklyn Experience, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L & Soc. CHaucE 105
(1997).
25. It may be the case (as many commentators maintain) that the preferences
of the citizens whom the legal aid workers serve are the product of false conscious-
ness, and ought not be taken as evidence of what those same citizens would choose
under better conditions of choice. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Dark Sera of
Progressive Lazo)ening- A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-
Reagan Era, 48 U. Mmm L. REv. 1099, 1102 (1994) ("Ihe Dark Secret of Progres-
sive lawyering is that effective lawyers cannot avoid makingjudgments in terms of
their own values and influencing their clients to adopt those judgments.") I do
not mean to imply that this view is incorrect. My point is that actual conversations
between lawyers and their clientele include many direct pleas for immediate, con-
ventional lawyering assistance.
26. There is a wonderful remark by Oscar Wilde of which Marc Feldman re-
minds us. According to Mrilde, "[t]he trouble with socialism is that it takes too
many evenings." Feldman, supra note 2, at 1542 n.29. Wflde's point is that greater
involvement requires greater resources. If legal services provides for either short-
term relief or long-term remedies, we can expect clients to opt for the short-term
relief. In fact, this is precisely the Rebel's argument: sublimation. There is redirec-
tion: short-term anxieties trump long-term benefits.
27. While it is hard to accept them as good faith suggestions, the voices of the
right wing of our country claim that legal services offices do very little to assist the
"worthy poor," but instead divert their resources into political efforts that the poor
clients neither need nor want. See, e.g., Rael Jean Isaac, War on the Poor Criticism of
the Legal Services Corporation, NAT'L REv., May 15, 1995, at 32 (describing legal serv-
ices programs as "designed to implement the philosophy of an elite corps of Six-
ties-style radicals... who use the poor as tools and then leave them behind as
victims"). Congressional critics of legal services programs have similarly described
LSG as "a relic of the welfare state that has espoused a leftist agenda." Taylor, supra
note 8, at AS; see also W. Clark Durant, Maximizing Access tojustice: A Ciallenge to the
Legal Profession, in DEBo -i L RHoDE & DAVID LuB.,N, LEcAL Etucs 832-40
(1992) (arguing for the abolition of LSG, and its replacement ith a network of lay
advocates and law students).
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trenchant criticisms of the traditional legal aid role are (1) that the
energies expended in those ameliorative efforts undercut a larger
goal of ending poverty, and (2) that the present legal aid model
does not even accomplish its current ameliorative goals very well.
The first of these criticisms is the Rebel's View; the second accepts
the conventional legal aid goals on their own terms (unlike the Re-
bel), but laments the record of the nation's legal services lawyers in
achieving that goal. To keep our labels separate, let us call this
latter criticism the Feldman View, after its most recent proponent.28
Both criticisms are essentially sound, despite their divergent
foundations. As noted above, the Rebel's View makes sense from
the distant perspective of theory, even if the lawyers and clients
struggling with day-to-day crises find it nearly impossible to accept.
The Feldman View also makes good sense, but it also encounters
resistance within the practicing legal aid world.29 Both criticisms
are likely to remain primarily concerns of academics, just as they
have been over the past two decades, unless the institutional struc-
tures within which legal aid lawyers work are changed to accommo-
date the wisdom of the critics. And, more importantly perhaps,
those institutional adjustments needed for such accommodation
frequently will marginalize the present voices of the client commu-
nity and the legal services staff members.
Marc Feldman, in his polemic about the present crisis in legal
services, identifies a major failing of subsidized poverty law to be its
exclusive focus on the here-and-now, on the citizens in distress who
happen by the office.30 If we accept his data, for the sake of argu-
28. See Feldman, supra note 2.
29. In some respects Marc Feldman's suggestions mirror those raised at least
20 years ago by Gary Bellow. See Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The
Legal Aid Experience, 34 NLADA BRIEFcAsE 106 (1977); Gary Bellow & Jeanne Ket-
tleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice,
58 B.U. L. REv. 337 (1978). Bellow and Kettleson (now Chain) continue to sympa-
thize with the Feldman View, even though they disagree with many of Professor
Feldman's specific criticisms and recommendations. See Gary Bellow & Jeanne
Charn, Paths Not Taken: Some Comments on Feldman's Critique of Legal Services Practice,
83 GEO. LJ. 1633 (1995).
30. See Feldman, supra note 2, at 1537-38; see also id. at 1539 ("[A) program
spends the vast majority of its legal resources on cases in which the horizon of
ambition is defined, even at its maximum, by the individual client."). As a promi-
nent example of the inefficiency and lack of vision of legal services programs, Feld-
man cites the response of legal aid to the cutbacks in Social Security programs in
the early 1980s, when the Reagan administration targeted over a million Social
Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI")
recipients for termination. Feldman describes that crisis as a paradigmatic exam-
ple of the kinds of political forces one finds marshaled against poor persons in our
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ment, he is justified in his complaint that legal services programs
operate inefficiently. The solution to this criticism, of course, is not
to respond to the here-and-now, and not to attend to or even hear
the pleas of the suffering women and children who show up in the
waiting room. Feldman may not expressly advocate that ap-
proach,31 but such distancing is a necessary corollary of his com-
plaint. That solution is relatively easy for law professors and
bureaucrats to suggest, but terribly difficult for the lawyers, parale-
gals, intake workers, and other staff members who work in poverty
law offices every day.
otherwise enlightened nation. See id. at 1613-14. He then proceeds to criticize the
lawyers' effort to defend against the massive cutbacks, not because it was not suc-
cessful, but because "[ilt did not diminish Social Security's or its sponsoring ad-
ministration's power, nor even the inclination to employ such tactics and to make
such wholesale cuts in the future." Id. at 1619.
31. In fact, his suggestions are remarkably inconsistent in this respect. Read-
ers of Feldman's critical assessment of legal services lawyers are entitled to feel
enormous frustration on this point. Feldman is articulately direct about two signif-
icant criticisms. The first criticism is that legal services lau 'ers "respond to the
immediate problems of specific clients who present themselves at the program's
offices seeking assistance," and that, as a result, their work is inefficient, unfocused,
lacking in planning, and insufficiently political. Feldman, suipra note 2, at 1537-38;
see also id. at 1546-47 (describing legal services work as too reliant on constituent
preferences); id. at 1575-78 (stating that the originators of the federal legal serv-
ices programs have succumbed to "the volume problem" and sacrificed law re-
form). The second criticism is that these attorneys are committed to "the
dominance of lawyer preferences," and "are ultimately disrespectful of client inter-
ests." Id. at 1593; see also id. at 1540-41 (arguing that lawyers are permitted too
much discretion to determine the quality and quantity of their work); id. at 1552
(decrying lawyers' lack of accountability to clients).
Feldman never acknowledges the apparent inconsistencies in these two senti-
ments. He embraces the "client voice" theme so common in critical literature and
chides poverty lawyers for dominating their clients and disrespecting their choices,
preferences, values, and priorities. At the same time, without blinking, he con-
demns those lawyers for succumbing to the "rescue mission," responding to the
community members who ask for their help, and ignoring the broader commit-
ments that the lawyers ought to recognize and respect. He fails to see that good
faith lawyers cannot both commit their agenda to constituent direction and resist
the requests for help with the crises that those constituents encounter. In fact, his
most telling criticisms of the staff lawyers-that they settle too easily, forgo sus-
tained litigation, privilege smaller or "routine" cases over larger litigation efforts-
all reflect, most plausibly, the lawyers' respect for the choices of their distressed
clients.
Oddly enough, Feldman may be right in both critiques, but blame is mis-
placed. Cf id. at 1531 (asserting that the current crisis "is... a crisis of Legal
Services lawyers' own making"). A more apt reaction would include sympathy for
the double bind in which these committed attorneys repeatedly find themselves.
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To accept the dominant suggestions for reform, an institution
must either: (a) instruct the front-line staff members to tell the
needy citizens in the waiting room that the lawyers and paralegals
will not help them; or (b) develop institutional measures to pre-
clude the front-line staff from interacting with those citizens at all.
The first solution may prove entirely unrealistic. It is true that in-
take workers and Information & Referral32 staff routinely inform
prospective clients every day that there is no room for new cases
and that, sadly, they must be turned away. It does seem, though,
that doing so is more palatable when the staff members understand
that the reason is that the legal staff is helping other similarly situ-
ated people who came in last week, or last month, or last year.
When the legal staff is committed not to direct service but to
projects which have less visible short-term results, it is much harder
for front-line staff to explain why they send suffering applicants
away. In any event, regardless of how the lawyers are otherwise dis-
posed, the staff that greets citizens at the door will always feel some
need to attempt to persuade the legal staff to assist the neediest.
When Feldman complains that legal services lawyers find it
hard not to separate themselves from the here-and-now, we under-
stand why he might observe that phenomenon. Advising lawyers
not to do so, however, is of quite limited utility unless one can sepa-
rate the distress in the waiting room from the staff in the office.
The tensions that account for the Feldman observations disappear,
or at least are lessened considerably, if the legal services institution
opts to close its doors to walk-in business. If legal services lawyers
believed that their energies would be better spent on projects
aimed at longer-term success, and that their responses to the here-
and-now only distracted them from more efficient ends, then it
would follow that legal services institutions ought to separate their
staff from the citizens in their community. That solution, however,
is extraordinarily problematic and inconsistent with the other val-
ues embraced by critics of legal services lawyers: respect for clients
and community-members and encouragement of their participa-
tion in the office's functioning. 3
32. Most urban legal aid programs offer Information & Referral ("I & R")
services in conjunction with their intake responsibilities. Since no program will
come close to accepting or offering even brief services to all the potential clients
who call, the I & R staff are trained to offer referrals to other community-based
organizations and pro bono services to those whom the legal aid program must
turn away.
33. See, e.g., Bellow & Charn, supra note 29, at 1638-41.
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One suggestion that might accommodate the legitimate con-
cerns expressed by Feldman and others, as well as the felt exper-
iences of the staff of a street-level legal aid office, would be to craft a
distinct division of labor within each institution. While some legal
staff would not respond to any immediate crises, other staff would
respond as well as triage principles would permit. The division
would need to be dear, if the pleas of the distressed are to be ig-
nored effectively, for otherwise the danger of "slippage" is too
great. Note that this division begins to resemble, in many respects,
the conventional demarcation between impact lawyers and direct-
service lawyers, a demarcation of which legal aid critics have consist-
ently disapproved.34
The suggestion just offered has implications for the "crisis"
theme which introduced this Essay. If the crisis is real, as we can
sadly assume it is, then the available pool of money for the repre-
sentation of poor citizens will continue to shrink. The bureaucra-
cies using these increasingly scarce funds will need to do so with
even greater efficiency. The heightened need for efficiency will
mean less attention to the here-and-now, and therefore more sepa-
ration from that suffering which-through the application of triage
principles-the institution will be forced to ignore.
V
WHO DECIDES?
This discussion leaves one important concept yet to be ad-
dressed. Scarcer funds means more pointed triage. More pointed
triage means segments of the poverty population which might have
been served with more money available will no longer be served. It
seems an undeniable assumption that the remaining lawyers will
not be able to do all that was accomplished before with greater
funding. At least, let us accept that as a plausible result. The obvi-
ous question that arises is who chooses, and how they choose, the
product of the triage decisionmaking. While that topic is an enor-
mously complicated one,35 it warrants a few words here.
34. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 2, at 1538-39 (suggesting, although never
defending fully, that the distinction is illusory and hence should be discarded);
Peter Margulies, Political Law'ering, One Person at a Time: The Challenge of Lxgal Wortk
Against Domestic rtolence for the Impact Litigation/Client Serke Debate, 3 Mci. J. GE
DER & L. 493 (1996) (arguing that what some criticize as "routine" service wvork has
important political implications).
35. A 1998 symposium sponsored by the Stein Center for Ethics and Public
Interest Law at Fordham University School of Law addressed that question in con-
siderable depth. See Symposium, Conference on the Dive. of Legal Serices to Low
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Marc Feldman and others have criticized legal services institu-
tions for failing to accomplish what might be called "maximum fea-
sible participation" of the citizens within the poverty community in
the choices made about allocation of scarce legal resources. s6 I
think these criticisms are overstated. I think the criticisms are over-
stated. I so conclude because the systems of arriving at principled
group decisionmaking on the allocation questions are extraordina-
rily imperfect; and, as a result, the best available solution in many
instances is for the management of the institution-the lawyers, in
other words-to mediate among the competing interests.
Because there is neither space nor time to develop this argu-
ment here,3 7 a few observations will have to suffice. First, I am not
suggesting that the lawyers managing the legal services office ought
to ignore the views and the experiences of those who live in their
service area. Of course, those data are among the most important
to consider in triage. The lawyers who develop priority schemes
have a mandate, approaching a fiduciary duty, to take account of
those interests and preferences.
Second, assuming (as will always be the case) that there are
more legal needs than legal resources available to meet them; and
assuming (as will always be the case) that the citizens of the poverty
law community will not speak with one voice about how to evaluate
the needs and the resulting triage, and will have understandably
differing interests with respect to that topic; and assuming (as will
always be the case) that there is no clearly defined representative
organization to perform the "logrolling"3s necessary to mediate
Income Persons: Professional and Ethical Issues, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming
1999).
36. The criticism comes from both the left and the right. See, e.g., Feldman,
supra note 2, at 1542-45; DOuGLAs BEsHARov, LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR: TIME
FOR REFORM 3-5 (1990).
37. I have provisionally developed this argument elsewhere. See Tremblay,
supra note 4, at 1144-49. For a more extended treatment of this issue, see Paul R.
Tremblay, Acting 'A Very Moral Kind of God. Triage among Poor Clients, 67 FoRDuAM.
L. REV. (forthcoming 1999).
38. "Logrolling" is a term of art in politics that is defined as "the trading of
votes by legislators to secure favorable action on projects of interest to each one."
Glenn S. Koppel, Populism, Politics, and Procedure: The Saga of Summary Judgment and
the RulemakingProcess in California, 24 PEPP. L. REv. 488 n.187 (1997) (quoting WEB.
STER'S NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1895 (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1986)). See gener-
ally James B. Kau & Paul H. Rubin, Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in
Congressional Voting, 22J.L. & ECON. 365 (1979); Gordon Tullock, A Simple Algebraic
Logrolling Model, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 419 (1970). The political art of logrolling is
not unlike the task that community groups must perform in their efforts to accom-
modate many conflicting interests.
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among the differing views and interests; and assuming (as will some-
times be the case) that the staff lawyers can act in good faith to me-
diate among those interests as well as they can;3 9 then it makes
sense that the lawyers perform that function. Note that in some
instances the lawyers will not act in good faith and wil place their
own needs (or likes, or insecurities) ahead of those of the commu-
nity. That fact is sad and regrettable, but its existence does not ne-
gate the force of the argument that the lawyers are still best
situated, relative to the alternatives, to perform the necessary triage.
VI
CONCLUSION
Money for lawyers for the poor is a scarce commodity and is
becoming even more scarce as the forces opposing the interests of
the poor become more influential. The "crisis" represented by the
current federal legislators and their hostility to this funding will be
magnified substantially if IOLTA schemes are found to violate the
Constitution.4° A scarcity of funding means increased conflict and
debate about how lawyers work when they are paid with those
funds.
I try here to defend the work of staff lawyers, working with too
many clients in too much distress, against academic criticisms com-
plaining about the limited vision of privileging short-term results
over grander, long-term goals. In doing so, I recognize the truth in
the critics' positions and the wisdom of their insights. But I remind
the critics to account for the practice experiences and the institu-
tional implications of their suggestions that poverty lawyers practice
with greater vision and creativity. There are costs, difficulties, and
considerable pain which accompany these creative and visionary
proposals. We owe it to the dedicated poverty lawyers to acknowl-
edge those trade-offs before denouncing their "routine" attention
to the daily misfortunes and injustices they encounter from the
needy citizens who appear at their doors.
39. For some empirical evidence that this expectation is not implausible, see
Ann Southworth, Law'er-Client Decisionmaking in Civil Rights and Pover Pracice: An
Empirical Study of Lawryers'Norms, 9 GEo. J. LEc A. Emics 1101 (1996).
40. See supra note 12 (discussing IOLTA funds); see also Phillips v. Washington
Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998). Editor's Note: On June 15, 1998, the United
States Supreme Court held that the interest income generated from aggregated
client funds held in IOTLA accounts was the private property of the ovner of the
principal (the client) for purposes of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. The Court remanded the case for a determination of
whether the funds have been "taken" by the State, and if so, the amount of "just
compensation" due to the plaintiff-clients.
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